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A recurring problem in quantum mechanics is to estimate either the state of a quantum system
or the measurement operator applied to it. If we wish to estimate both, then the difficulty is
that the state and the measurement always appear together: to estimate the state, we must use a
measurement; to estimate the measurement operator, we must use a state. The data of such quantum
estimation experiments come in the form of measurement frequencies. Ideally, the measured average
frequencies can be attributed to an average state and an average measurement operator. If this is
not the case, we have correlated state-preparation-and-measurement (SPAM) errors. We extend
some tests developed to detect such correlated errors to apply to a cryptographic scenario in which
two parties trust their individual states but not the measurement performed on the joint state.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum-state tomography started from the question
whether a quantum-mechanical wave function is a mea-
surable thing. The answer is clear now, a quantum state
can be reconstructed from data from a sufficient number
of different measurements on many systems prepared in
the same state [1, 2]. One condition for this reconstruc-
tion to work is that the state-preparation procedure is
reproducible, i.e., that it indeed produces a well-defined
state, at least on average (there may well be (small) ran-
dom fluctuations). A second condition is that we know
what measurements we actually perform.
In recent years we have come to realize that the lat-
ter condition is not so easy to fulfill, and that often we
have just as much or as little control about the states
we prepare as about the measurements we do. That is,
SPAM (state-preparation and measurement) errors are
inevitable. In response, self-consistent versions of tomog-
raphy have been introduced that aim to estimate both
quantum states and measurements [and even quantum
gates, applied after state preparation and before mea-
surement, as well] in a self-consistent manner, such that
the measurement data are fully explained by those state
and measurement descriptions [3–9]. These schemes have
become important for diagnosing small and subtle errors
in small quantum computing devices.
One can go one step further than self-consistent tomog-
raphy and perform overcomplete sets of measurements on
overcomplete sets of states that allow one to check the
assumption that a given state-preparation procedure in-
deed produces a single specific state, and that a given
measurement procedure indeed produces a single specific
measurement. In particular, “holonomic” SPAM tomog-
raphy or “loop” SPAM tomography denote a procedure
to check for correlations between measurement and state-
preparation [10, 11]. For example, suppose one uses a
laser to perform a measurement on a system whose state
was prepared using that same laser just a microsecond
ago. It may well be that the measurement performed
depends on (and so is correlated with) what state was
created. Importantly, checking for this type of correla-
tions with the protocol from Ref. [10] does not require
one to either reconstruct or know the measurement and
state operators.
With multiple quantum systems there may be correla-
tions between different measurements or between differ-
ent state preparations as well. Those correlations, too,
can be detected (again, without the need for reconstruct-
ing state and measurement operators) [12–14]. We focus
here on the case of two qubits A and B and as usual
we assume these are controlled by Alice and by Bob, re-
spectively. There are two scenarios of interest to us: (i)
Alice and Bob share an entangled state and perform sep-
arate measurements, each on their own qubit, (ii) Alice
and Bob separately prepare states of their own qubit and
then send their qubits to a device that performs a joint
measurement. The probability to get a particular mea-
surement outcome can be written for both scenarios in
the form
P = Tr(αA ⊗ βBξAB). (1)
Here, in scenario (i), ξ denotes the joint state of qubits
A and B, and α and β represent the single-qubit mea-
surements Alice and Bob perform, respectively. In sce-
nario (ii) ξ denotes the joint measurement and α and β
represent the single-qubit states Alice and Bob prepare,
respectively. Mathematically these two scenarios are ob-
viously very similar: one difference is that measurement
operators are not normalized while states (represented by
density operators) are. In both scenarios the idea is for
Alice and Bob to gain information about ξ by trying out
different (state or measurement) operators α
(k)
A and β
(l)
B .
Here k, l = 1 . . .N , where N is some suitable number
large enough to be able to tomographically reconstruct ξ
if the operators α
(k)
A and β
(l)
B were all known (for more
details, see the next Section).
Scenario (i) was implemented experimentally recently
[14]. Even if ξ is a product state, a Bell inequality may
be violated [a “fake violation”] if Alice’s and Bob’s mea-
surements are sufficiently strongly correlated. Loop to-
mography allows Alice (and by symmetry, Bob, too) to
check for exactly those correlations.
Here we’re interested in the second scenario, whose set-
ting is as follows. Alice and Bob each prepare individual
qubits that they then send to a measurement device (not
under their control) that is supposed to perform a par-
ticular joint two-outcome measurement (e.g., projecting
onto a singlet state such that ξ = |singlet〉〈singlet|: the
two outcomes are “yes” or “click” and “no” or “no click”,
the latter described by the operator 1 − ξ). The device
may, however, perform a different measurement that, in
addition, may depend on what states Alice and Bob sent.
For example, an eavesdropper may have some (imperfect)
knowledge of which state either Alice or Bob sent and
adjust the measurement. The measurement procedure is
then described by an operator ξ that depends on either
Alice’s or Bob’s input states. We will show how Alice and
Bob can exploit loop tomography to detect that type of
measurement dependence on their own states.
In spite of the great mathematical similarity between
the two scenarios, there is one crucial difference. In sce-
nario (ii) the measurement ξ produces just one bit of in-
formation, as opposed to the two bits of information pro-
duced by Alice’s and Bob’s single-qubit measurements to-
gether in scenario (i). This will mean that Alice will have
to make use of her knowledge of her state-preparation
procedure to find correlations between ξ and her states.
(Similarly for Bob.) In the experimental implementation
of scenario (i) [14] no such knowledge was necessary.
Note that scenario (ii) is exactly the setting of
measurement-device independent quantum cryptography
(including the assumption Alice and Bob do know their
own states, but not the measurement ξ) [15]. Similarly,
the recently developed twin-field quantum cryptographic
protocol [16–18] fits our scenario (ii), and so does the
qubit version of that protocol [19]. On the other hand,
Ekert’s quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol uses
separate measurements and jointly prepared states [20],
and thus fits scenario (i).
It is now high time to provide a fully detailed descrip-
tion of our main scenario (ii) and prove our assertions.
II. LOOP SPAM TOMOGRAPHY
A. Scenario (ii)
If Alice and Bob together would like to be able to
tomographically reconstruct the two-qubit measurement
operator ξ, they each need to prepare 4 different (lin-
early independent) states of their qubits. Given proba-
bilities of the form (1), Alice and Bob can gather the mea-
sured frequencies of detector “clicks” in a 4-by-4 data ma-
trix whose expectation value should (if there is a unique
single-valued operator ξ) have the form
F kl = Tr{αkA ⊗ βlB ξAB} (2)
for k, l = 1 . . . 4. The trace on the right-hand-side of
Eq. (2) can be calculated by expanding all operators in
the Pauli basis as follows
αk =
∑
i
αki σi, β
l =
∑
i
βli σi, ξ =
∑
i,j
xij σi⊗σj . (3)
Substituting these expansions into the definition of the
data matrix and noting that
Tr{σiσj ⊗ σkσl} = 4δijδkl, (4)
yields the equation
F kl = 4
∑
i,j
xijα
k
i β
l
j . (5)
Eliminating the factor of four by defining S = F/4, we
can rewrite the equation for S as a matrix equation
S = ATXB (6)
whereX has matrix element xij and A has columns made
from vectors of the Pauli expansion coefficients of Alice’s
operators, and B is similarly defined for Bob. Multi-
plying both sides of this equation on the left by (AT )−1
[we assume the inverse exists, i.e., we assume Alice’s 4
operators to be linearly independent] yields
(AT )−1S = XB. (7)
Now we assume that both Alice and Bob have control
over their own operators such that these operators do
not vary over the course of the experiment. Next, sup-
pose that there are two trials, each using a different (not
identical) set of operators αk for Alice but the same set
of operators βl for Bob. Then we can eliminate the un-
known matrix X and write the condition on there being
a unique X that does not depend on which operators αk
Alice is using, as
(AT1 )
−1S1 = (A
T
2 )
−1S2, (8)
where the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equation
represent trials with different operators αk
′
. One alter-
native useful way of rewriting this same equation is
S1S
−1
2 A
T
2 (A
T
1 )
−1 = 1 , (9)
even though this may fail, namely, if S2 is not invertible.
It is helpful to write this matrix product out in terms of
the coefficients:
∑
k,l,m
(S1)ik(S
−1
2 )kl(A
T
2 )lm((A
T
1 )
−1)mj = δij (10)
Written this way, it is easy to see how this equation can
be used to test for dependence of ξ on Alice’s operators:
suppose, without loss of generality, that ξ is somehow dif-
ferent for the operator αiA of the first trial. Then every
row but the ith row of S1 is inverted by the remaining
three matrices. Therefore, only the ith row of the left-
hand side matrix will differ from the identity. Conversely,
since Alice is able to calculate the left-hand side of (10)
just from her knowledge of her operators αk and from the
data matrices S1 and S2 she can diagnose, without need-
ing any knowledge about Bob’s operators βl, with which
of her state preparations the measurement is correlated.
She also does not need to reconstruct the measurement
operator ξ.
Note that all we need for this to work is that the trials
are not identical. That is, Alice needs just 5 different
states at a minimum [to make two non-identical sets of 4
states] to be able to run this check.
(By symmetry, Bob could diagnose the presence of cor-
relations between ξ and his states βl without needing
knowledge of Alice’s operators. In this case Bob would
need to prepare at least 5 different states.)
B. Example
Consider the following example, where, for simplicity,
we will ignore statistical fluctuations in the observed fre-
quencies.
In each run, Bob prepares one of four different states
|ψk〉 for k = 1 . . . 4,
|ψ1〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
|ψ2〉 = |0〉+ i |1〉√
2
|ψ3〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
|ψ4〉 = |0〉 (11)
Bob will tell Alice what number k he picked, but does
not reveal what the corresponding states are.
Alice chooses five different states, the same four states
that Bob chooses from, and in addition
|ψ5〉 = |1〉 . (12)
Both Alice and Bob send their qubits to a measurement
device located somewhere between their labs. The device
projects onto the singlet state, except when Alice sends a
qubit in state number 5. In that case, the measurement
projects onto, say, the symmetric state
|symm〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√
2
. (13)
If Alice gathers the relative frequencies of the “yes” out-
comes for her states k = 1 . . . 4 in combination with Bob’s
choices k′ in the matrix S1 (as defined above) she finds
(ignoring statistical fluctuations!)
S1 =


0 1/4 1/2 1/4
1/4 0 1/4 1/4
1/2 1/4 0 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/4 0

 . (14)
This corresponds to the device projecting onto the singlet
state. For example, on the diagonal we find 0’s because
the input state is symmetric; the entries for k = 1, k′ = 3
and k = 3, k′ = 1 are 1/2, because the input is a prod-
uct state in the antisymmetric subspace. Her matrix A1
describing the expansion coefficients of her first 4 states
in the Pauli basis is
A1 =


1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 −1/2 0
0 −1/2 0 0
0 0 0 1/2

 . (15)
Multiplying (AT1 )
−1 by S1 gives her the result
(AT1 )
−1S1 =


1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
−1/2 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 −1/2

 . (16)
If Alice includes the results from her fifth choice by
replacing her fourth state choice, then she finds
S2 =


0 1/4 1/2 1/4
1/4 0 1/4 1/4
1/2 1/4 0 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/4 0

 . (17)
The first three rows here are the same as in S1 because
they describe exactly the same data. The fourth row
pertains to her using the state |ψ5〉 = |1〉 instead of
|ψ4〉 = |0〉, and, unbeknownst to her, that row corre-
sponds to the different measurement |sym〉〈sym|. Her
state matrix A2 is now
A2 =


1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 −1/2 0
0 −1/2 0 0
0 0 0 −1/2

 . (18)
where the last column is different from that in A1.
Multiplying (AT2 )
−1 with S2 now gives her
(AT2 )
−1S2 =


1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
−1/2 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 0
0 0 0 1/2

 . (19)
This should be equal to the matrix in (16), but Alice
notices the discrepancy in the last row, and concludes
(correctly) that the measurement performed must have
been different for states |ψ4〉 and |ψ5〉.
Alternatively, calculating the single matrix
S1S
−1
2 A
T
2 (A
T
1 )
−1—which works here because S2 is
indeed invertible—gives her the result
S1S
−1
2 A
T
2 (A
T
1 )
−1 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1

 . (20)
Again, the last row is not what it should be for the right-
hand side to be the identity matrix, leading Alice to the
same correct conclusion that there is a correlation be-
tween the measurement performed and either state num-
ber 4 or state number 5.
Of course, by subsequently replacing, say, state num-
ber 1 by state number 5, the same calculation would show
her that either state 5 or state 1 is to blame. (Note she
does not have to do a new experiment, just construct
new matrices from the same data.) Combining the two
results then conclusively points to a correlation between
her state number 5 and the joint measurement.
C. Application to quantum cryptography
As mentioned in the Introduction, scenario (ii) fits par-
ticular cryptographic protocols very well, measurement-
device independent cryptography [15], as well as the im-
proved “twin-field” versions [16–19]. In these protocols,
Alice and Bob each repeatedly and independently pre-
pare qubits in certain (secret) quantum states, chosen
from a fixed set, and send them to a measurement de-
vice, which is located halfway between their labs. This
device is supposed to do a particular measurement (e.g.,
projecting onto the singlet state), but since it is not under
Alice’s or Bob’s control, they must verify the measure-
ment results for a randomly chosen small subset R. For
example, Bob could communicate to Alice what states he
prepared (just for the set R). Alice can verify, for exam-
ple, that in all those cases where Bob sent the same state
as she sent, the singlet outcome never occurred.
Note that in our protocol there is no need for Bob to
tell Alice what state he sent, which is an advantage. On
the other hand, in our protocol Alice and Bob will have
to choose from a larger set of possible states (containing
at least 5 different states) than in Ref. [15]’s protocol.
We can interpret the additional states as “decoy states.”
The idea of decoy states—which do not contribute to
generating a secret bit but are meant to better detect
an eavesdropper—has been known to be very useful in
cryptographic contexts [21]. Thus, we suggest that our
protocol can be smoothly incorporated into the standard
measurement-device independent cryptography protocol
as well as into the recently developed twin-field versions
[16–19] of that protocol.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we presented a tomographic protocol
that is meant to detect correlations between measure-
ments and state preparation, without the need to know
or estimate what the measurement device actually does.
The main point was to extend results of Refs. [10–14],
which were meant to provide tests for small correlated
errors in quantum computing devices. While debugging
small quantum computers forms one application of our
scheme, it fits measurement device independent cryptog-
raphy [15–19] very well, and so we suggest our scheme
can be fruitfully integrated with that protocol, too.
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